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Abstract
Community monitoring is believed to be successful only where there is sustained funding, legislation for communities to
enforce rules, clear tenure rights, and an enabling environment created by the state. Against this backdrop, we present the
case of an autonomous grassroots-monitoring network that took the initiative to protect their forest, in a context, where no
external incentives and rule enforcement power were provided. The aim was to analyze the socio-demographic and
economic backgrounds, motivations and achievements of forest monitors, compared to non-monitors in the same
communities. A total of 137 interviews were conducted in four villages bordering Prey Lang forest in Cambodia. We used
binary logit models to identify the factors that inﬂuenced the likelihood of being a monitor. Results show that there were few
(22%, n= 30) active monitors. Active monitors were intrinsically motivated forest-users, and not speciﬁcally associated with
a particular gender, ethnicity, or residence-time in that area. The most common interventions were with illegal loggers, and
the monitors had a general feeling of success in stopping the illegal activities. Most (73%, n= 22) of them had been
threatened by higher authorities and loggers. Our results show that despite the lack of power to enforce rules, absence of
external funding and land-ownership rights, and enduring threats of violence and conﬂicts, autonomous community
monitoring may take place when community members are sufﬁciently motivated by the risk of losing their resources.
Keywords Participatory monitoring ● Community-based conservation ● Natural resource management ● Commons ●
Indigenous people ● Collective action
Introduction
Nature conservation requires constant monitoring of the
natural resources or ecosystems to be protected, which can
be expensive and hard to sustain over time (Sheil 2001).
Participatory approaches that include local stakeholders in
natural resource monitoring have been presented as a cost-
effective solution to cover extensive areas over long periods
of time (Moller et al. 2004; Danielsen et al. 2005; Takahashi
and Todo 2012).
Locally based monitoring of illegal activities has proven
effective to reduce poaching (e.g., de Merode et al. 2007;
Dobson and Lynes 2008; Keane et al. 2011) and illegal
ﬁshing (e.g., Petrossian 2015) all over the world. Local
monitoring can especially help in conservation’s blind
spots, i.e., local people can contribute to prevent and control
the unregulated exploitation within and outside formally
protected areas (PAs), although this is seldom recognized
by conservation professionals (Sheil et al. 2015). The ben-
eﬁts of local monitoring in forest condition have been
shown to depend on well-deﬁned boundaries of the
resources, high level of forest-dependence, high social
capital (Agrawal 2001), and rule enforcement power (Gib-
son et al. 2005; Chhatre and Agrawal 2008) among other
factors.
Danielsen et al. (2008) categorized monitoring approa-
ches based on the relative level of involvement of local
people and professional scientists or experts: (1) externally
driven and professionally executed; (2) externally driven
with local data collectors; (3) collaborative monitoring with
external data interpretation; (4) collaborative monitoring
with local data interpretation and; (5) autonomous local
monitoring. In categories 1–4, external actors play a
decreasing role in design and execution of the monitoring
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activities, while the ﬁfth category is deﬁned by absence of
external inputs.
Autonomous local monitoring is rarely present in the
scientiﬁc literature due to its informal and independent
nature; hence the results are rarely documented (Berkes
1999; Danielsen et al. 2008; Sheil et al. 2015). In spite of
this, evidence exists that locally developed monitoring is a
valuable complement to expert-based approaches (Moller
et al. 2004; Danielsen et al. 2005). For example, hunters can
provide observations of animal populations and help
improve the regulations (Rist et al. 2009; Singh et al. 2014).
Thus, local people may help achieve long-term nature
conservation goals, as regular monitoring and sanctioning
may lead to successful natural-resource management and
protection (Ostrom 1990; Gibson et al. 2005; Takahashi and
Todo 2012; Sheil et al. 2015).
However, when deﬁning “local people”, and often also
“indigenous people”, in the literature on successful man-
agement of commons, researchers tend to group together a
large spectrum of socio-economic backgrounds, personal
values, and behaviors toward nature. Not all individuals in a
society, even in small-scale societies, necessarily share the
common values of nature conservation (De Young 1993;
DeCaro and Stokes 2008) or, as we hypothesize in this
study, the willingness to monitor and actively protect the
associated natural resources. Such values may be self-held
or intrinsic beliefs, preferences, or concerns related to nature
(DeCaro and Stokes 2008). For example, the willingness to
“help the environment”, socialize with people having
similar interests, and learning about the environment have
been shown to be important motivations to participate in
environmental projects (Bruyere and Rappe 2007). Parti-
cularly, the sense of place (i.e., place attachment and place
meaning) can be a motivation for stewardship and for taking
action to care for the environment (Masterson et al. 2017).
Long-term conservation potential depends heavily on
local people being motivated to commit their time con-
tinuously over several years (DeCaro and Stokes 2008;
Garcia and Lescuyer 2008). Studies that have analyzed
motivations to engage in nature conservation initiatives
argue that commitment is more plausible when motivations
are intrinsic, rather than extrinsic, i.e., when incentivized
externally (De Young 1993; DeCaro and Stokes 2008;
García-Amado et al. 2013). Intrinsic motivations are related
to human core-values and attitudes toward nature (Chan
et al. 2012, Raymond et al. 2013, Von Heland and Folke
2014), and may guide and constrain human actions (Folke
et al. 2010, Adger et al. 2011, Berkes and Ross 2013).
Extrinsic motivations may be monetary reinforcement, uti-
litarian interests, social recognition or pressure, fear, pun-
ishment, or legal mandates (De Young 1993; García-Amado
et al. 2013). However, pre-existing intrinsic motivations are
seldom studied in schemes that introduce other types of
incentives, such as payments for ecosystem services (Rode
et al. 2015).
The present study examined an autonomous network of
forest-monitoring groups working across four provinces in
Cambodia to investigate who the ‘local people’ that engage
in community-led monitoring are and what motivates them
to engage in a context where no external incentives are
provided. We analyzed the (i) socio-demographic and
economic backgrounds of people who engage in forest
monitoring and people who do not; (ii) their motivations to
engage in forest monitoring activities; and (iii) what their
monitoring activities lead to including perceived results of
the monitoring effort, feeling of success, and constraints to
their work.
We use the terms monitoring and patrolling inter-
changeably, referring to the act of surveying the forest and
recording data.
Case Study
This case study is based on the initiative of the Prey Lang
Community Network (PLCN) to monitor their ancestral
forests in the Central Plains of Cambodia, which can be
characterized as community-led-and-executed monitoring
[ﬁfth category, according to Danielsen et al. (2008)]. In
order to patrol and protect Prey Lang from deforestation, the
self-organized forest monitoring network independently
designed the monitoring scheme and carried out all infor-
mation gathering and reporting of the gathered information.
The case of PLCN was purposefully chosen as an example
of an autonomous grassroots monitoring network that
receives no external incentives and has no formal rule
enforcement power.
Cambodia has the world’s third highest national defor-
estation rate (Hansen et al. 2013), mainly driven by large-
scale acquisitions of land for agro-industrial purposes, pri-
marily in the form of economic land concessions (ELCs) and
mining concessions (Davis et al. 2015; Jiao et al. 2015; Work
and Thuon 2017). These have led to a large scale agricultural
conversion of forest land and extensive illegal logging
operations outside the borders of the ofﬁcially granted con-
cession areas, which is in conﬂict with the land law, forestry
law, and law on PAs. For further reading about Cambodia’s
politics of forest exploitation in the 1990s, see Le Billon
(2000), Le Billon (2002), and Global Witness (2002), and for
the 2000s, read Global Witness (2007) and Milne (2015).
Since 1993, Cambodia’s conservation strategies have
focused on establishing PAs, but because of the poorly
deﬁned land and resource rights, weak governance and law
enforcement, and the establishment of the PAs in populated
areas of limited ecological signiﬁcance, biodiversity con-
servation goals are not being met (Clements et al. 2010).
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Prey Lang forest covers around 530,000 ha in the central
plains of the country, rendering it the largest lowland ever-
green forest remaining in the Indochinese Peninsula. Prey
Lang forest holds great ecological (Theilade et al. 2011;
Hayes et al. 2015), economic (Jiao et al. 2015; Hüls Dyrmose
et al. 2017), and cultural (Turreira-García et al. 2017) value.
The map in Fig. 1 shows Prey Lang (dark gray) situated
within the four provinces, namely, Kampong Thom, Kratie,
Stung Treng, and Preah Vihear with 52 communities having
active members of the PLCN (white squares) and the 43
communities having no PLCN members (black diamonds).
Roughly 250,000 people live in Prey Lang and its sur-
rounding areas. The majority of the population relies
directly on the forest for their livelihoods, with resin
extraction from dipterocarp trees being the main source of
cash income for many (Hüls Dyrmose et al. 2017). Prey
Lang is also a source of medicines, food, building materials,
and ﬁrewood (Turreira-García et al. 2017). Access to nat-
ural resources is customary and without ofﬁcial property
rights. The predominant ethnic groups are Kuy (indigenous)
and Khmer (Cambodian). In Prey Lang both ethnic groups
practice animism, and are culturally and spiritually linked to
their forests (Turreira-García et al. 2017).
In May 2016, 432,000 ha of Prey Lang was declared as a
“Wildlife Sanctuary” (Fig. 1). Before the establishment of
the PA, Prey Lang was affected by 53 concessions,
including roughly 50,000 ha of agro-industrial ELCs and
mining concessions (Open Development Cambodia 2014).
The concessions launder illegal timber from the surrounding
areas destroying natural resources that much of the local
population relies on (Forest Trends 2015). This has created
a conﬂict between the local groups who want to protect the
forest and the groups who derive income from timber
extraction. Village headmen and local authorities, with
vested economic interests in the logging industry, often use
verbal and physical threats to hinder actions to stop illegal
loggers (Milne 2015; Cultural Survival 2016).
The inhabitants of Prey Lang have traditionally patrolled
the forest to protect resin trees and other natural resources.
In the early 2000s, rampant illegal logging led some of the
inhabitants to organize themselves into a forest monitoring
group, called the PLCN. The PLCN advocates for forest
protection and conservation through peaceful patrols and
conﬁscation of logging equipment and illegally logged
timber. Currently, the PLCN is not formally recognized by
the Cambodian Government and has no rule enforcement or
sanctioning power.
PLCN is organized into a steering committee (four
people in 2015), a core group (20 people), and a group of
ordinary members (about 500 people), all of whom are
volunteers. The steering committee and the core members
are selected through elections held in each province. The
steering committee and the core group members organize
meetings and patrols when someone warns of suspicious
activity in the forest. The patrol groups vary in size and
often consist of 15–20 people on motorbikes, covering
various sections of the Prey Lang core zone as well as the
major logging roads in and out of the area. Reports on
illegal logging are ﬁled and sent to authorities, the con-
ﬁscated equipment is turned over to the authorities upon
completion of the patrol, and the illegally cut timber is
seized and burned on the site.
Fig. 1 Prey Lang forest (left)
and its location in Cambodia
(top-right). Forest-cover map
modiﬁed from (Open
Development Cambodia 2014),
economic land concessions and
mining licenses data, taken from
Licadho (2015)
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Methods
This mixed-methods study involved both members of
the PLCN and a random sample of people from the
general population in the villages surrounding Prey Lang.
This composite sample allowed us to compare the socio-
demographic and economic backgrounds, and the views
of the co-inhabitants of a PA to ultimately characterize
community-led forest monitoring in Prey Lang,
Cambodia.
Structured Interviews
A structured interview was designed after conducting a
workshop in August 2014 with the PLCN core group
members, where they shared their experiences monitoring
the forest: their history, current status, encounters, and
motivations. Additionally, semi-structured interviews with
the steering committee of the PLCN and NGOs that had
collaborated in Prey Lang were used to gather background
information about Prey Lang and the monitoring network.
The questionnaire was pilot tested with two PLCN
members.
A total of 137 structured interviews were carried out
between January and May 2015. Interviews included both
the members of PLCN and the non-members. First, we
interviewed 21 PLCN members (18 men and 3 women) that
attended the network’s annual meeting in January 2015.
Attendants came from villages of all four provinces of Prey
Lang and every third person on the attendance list was
selected for the interview. In the following months, we
visited four villages and randomly selected from a list of
villages where PLCN was active, one in each of the pro-
vinces where Prey Lang extends (Fig. 1, Triangles). In these
villages, one person in every third household was inter-
viewed regardless if they were members of PLCN or not,
resulting in a total of 116 interviews (68 men and 48
women). To participate in the interview, the respondent had
to be older than 16 years of age. In this way, we were able
to get an overview of the representation and proﬁle of the
PLCN members, compared to the non-PLCN members in
the selected villages. In the randomly selected villages, only
two people declined to participate.
The ﬁrst part of the interview dealt with the socio-
demographic and economic background of the respondent
and included the variables shown in Table 1. Gender, age,
marital status, and ethnicity were variables also considered
in Staddon et al. (2014). An interpreter asked the questions
and translated the answers, which were recorded by the
authors NTG and DA.
The second part of the interview focused on the partici-
pation in forest monitoring activities. Respondents were
asked if they had ever heard of the PLCN and were they a
member of it, were patrolling independently or were not
involved in any form of patrolling. All members were
interviewed about how often they participated, types of
encounters in previous patrols, success in stopping illegal
activities, and about threats and conﬂicts experienced.
Finally, all the respondents, whether members of PLCN
or not, were asked if and why Prey Lang was personally
important to them (open ended question).
Ranking Exercise
Among the 137 interviews, it emerged that 35 respondents
were monitors (present and past), i.e., had regularly engaged
in forest patrolling at some point in time. This sample
included ﬁve monitors who were not actively monitoring
the forest at the time of the study, but had done it in the past
and could still relate to their motivations. The 35 monitors
were requested to rank ﬁve pre-deﬁned motivations for
patrolling. The categories emerged from the discussion with
PLCN core group members in August 2014 about their
motivations to monitor the forest.
The motivation categories ranked were: “protect Prey
Lang”, “stop illegal activities”, “report illegal activities”,
“collect natural resources” (monitors often collect rattan and
vegetables, while undertaking monitoring activities), and
“obtain economic revenue” (in the form of compensation
provided by PLCN to cover travel and food costs). The
categories captured particular functional distinctions and
reﬂected the conceptual framework, described by García-
Amado et al. (2013): (1) the categories “protect Prey Lang”
and “stop illegal activities” were included to reﬂect intrinsic
motivations, (2) “report illegal activities” and “collect nat-
ural resources” to reﬂect utilitarian motivations, and (3)
“obtain economic revenue” to reﬂect the monetary moti-
vation. An option to mention any other motivation was also
given. Finally, the respondents were asked if, in the hypo-
thetical event, that an NGO hired him/her to patrol, the
resulting economic revenue (wage) would change their
ranking of the ﬁve motivation categories.
Data Analysis
We compared the socio-demographic and socio-economic
backgrounds of members of PLCN against non-members to
characterize people who show at least a nominal interest in
forest protection. We further compared the active monitors
against the non-active monitoring members of PLCN to
characterize who was actively engaged in forest protection.
Active monitors were deﬁned as people who, at the time of
the study, regularly participated in patrols. People who only
participated occasionally and PLCN members who did not
participate in monitoring were not regarded as active
monitors in the analysis.
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After evaluating all answers regarding the personal
importance of Prey Lang, four main types of responses were
identiﬁed: (1) because of its useful natural resources; (2)
because of its environmental importance for current and
future generations, (3) for other reasons and (4) the
respondent did not consider Prey Lang as important. The
third category included responses such as ‘Prey Lang helps
rice farming and forest gardening’ and ‘it is the legacy from
our ancestors’. Each respondent could provide multiple
reasons, and therefore the score in more than one category.
In the analysis, the four response categories were
represented by four binary variables: (1) forest dependency,
(2) environmental awareness, (3) other, and (4) not impor-
tant (Table 1).
Factors that inﬂuenced the likelihood of being a PLCN
member were identiﬁed, using a binary logit model. The
factors considered in the model included gender, marital
status, age, ethnicity, residence time, occupation, and Prey
Lang importance (see all variables in Table 1). A backward
elimination approach was used to select the variables that
were signiﬁcant in the model (below the 5% level). Non-
signiﬁcant variables were identiﬁed using Type 3 Wald
Table 1 Variables obtained through the structured interview and summary of the data
Variable Speciﬁcations
Socio-demographic variables
Gendera Males (n= 88); Females (n= 49)
Ageb Age of respondent (years)
Age classc Age class 1 (16–30 years, n= 36); Age class 2 (31–40 years, n= 37); Age class 3 (41–50
years, n= 35); Age class 4 (>50 years, n= 29)
Marrieda Married (n= 118); Unmarried (includes singles and widows, n= 19)
Kuya Kuy (1, n= 46); Khmer (0, n= 91)
Residence timea Native/Long-term resident (>10 year of residence, n= 105); Newcomer (≤10 year, n= 32)
Member of PLCNa Yes (n= 62); No (n= 75)
Occupation related variables
Farmera Respondent was a farmer (n= 130) or not (n= 7)
Resin tappera Respondent or household members extracted resin (n= 39) or not (n= 98). Separated
from other NTFPs due to its high economic importance in Prey Lang
NTFP collectora Respondent collected NTFPs other than resin (n= 105) or not (n= 32)
Businessman/womana Respondent or household members had a small shop or business (n= 66) or not (n= 71)
Livestock ownera Respondent or household members raised domestic animals, sell them or spend time
walking the cattle (n= 116) or not (n= 21)
Commune leadership groupa Respondent is a village headman, a commune advisor or a secretary (n= 6) or not (n=
131)
Seasonal workera Respondent or household members worked temporarily in other farmer’s ﬁelds and/or
resin trees, or sells seasonal fruits and vegetables to middle men (n= 104) or not (n= 33)
Experiences
Types of encounters in patrols Illegal loggers (building a farm); Illegal loggers (working for a company); Timber left on
ground; Timber being transported; Sawing materials; Company overextending license;
Illegal ﬁshing; Illegal mining; Illegal hunting; Company without license
Freq. of encountering illegal activities Few times; Often; In every patrol
Success in stopping activities Never; Occasionally; Always
Perceived importance of the forest
Forest dependencya Mentioned the importance of its natural resources (n= 107) or not (n= 30)
Environmental awarenessa Mentioned its environmental importance for current and future generations (n= 53) or not
(n= 84)
Othera Mentioned other reasons (n= 32) or not (n= 105)
Not importanta Respondent did not consider Prey Lang as important (n= 13) or did (n= 124)
Motivations Protect Prey Lang; Stop illegal activities; Report illegal activities; Collect natural
resources; Economic revenue
aBinary
bContinuous
cOrdinal variables
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chi-square tests and eliminated. The goodness-of-ﬁt of all
the binary logit models tested were compared using the log-
likelihood, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), and the
Schwarz Criterion (SC) of the models. For respondents who
were members of PLCN, the same procedure was followed
to build a binary logit model describing the probability of
being an active monitor.
To analyze the data from the ranking exercise, each
motivation category received a score expressing its per-
ceived importance (score= 6 – rank), upon which, the
mean scores were calculated for each of the ﬁve motivation
categories. These were then compared using the
Kruskal–Wallis test and Wilcoxon’s Signed Rank test.
Results
Socio-demographic and Economic Backgrounds
Of the 137 people interviewed, 62 were members of PLCN.
A number of variables were found to characterize the
members (Table 2): Firstly, non-timber forest product
(NTFP) collectors had a higher likelihood of being members
of PLCN than people who did not collect NTFPs. Secondly,
compared to the oldest age class (Age class 4, >50 years)
that acted as the reference class, people in age class 1
(16–30 years) had a signiﬁcantly lower likelihood of being
members, whereas people in age classes 2 and 3 (31–40 and
41–50 years, respectively) had a slightly higher likelihood
of being members, which was signiﬁcant for people in age
class 3. Thirdly, married people had lower likelihood of
being members of PLCN than people who were not mar-
ried. Finally, people who did not mention Prey Lang as
important had lower probability of being a member.
In total, 30 people were actively monitoring the forest at
the time of the study. When analyzing what made a member
of PLCN an active monitor, almost all of the variables
included in the model (Table 1) turned out to be non-
signiﬁcant. Hence, the reduced model describing the like-
lihood of being an active monitor included only occupation
and marital status (Table 3). Respondents could list more
than one occupation, and it emerged that resin tappers and
NTFP collectors were signiﬁcantly more likely to be active
monitors than people who were not resin tappers or NTFP
collectors. By contrast, respondents who did some sort of
business unrelated to natural resources had a signiﬁcantly
lower likelihood of being monitors than non-businessmen/
women. Similarly, people who considered themselves as
farmers had a signiﬁcantly lower likelihood of being
monitors than non-farmers. Married PLCN members had a
signiﬁcantly lower likelihood of being active monitors than
people who were not married.
Table 2 Parameter and odds ratio (OR) estimates for a binary logit model describing factors inﬂuencing the likelihood of being a member of
PLCN. Model AIC= 178.3, SC= 198.8, -2 Log L= 164.3, and n= 137
Parameter Estimate (SE) p-value OR estimate 95% Wald conﬁdence
limits
Intercept 0.9772 (0.6934) 0.1588 – – –
NTFP collector 0.8896 (0.4733) 0.0602 2.434 0.963 6.155
Age class 1 vs. 4 −1.3836 (0.4431) 0.0018 0.201 0.055 0.730
Age class 2 vs. 4 0.2580 (0.3228) 0.4241 1.035 0.368 2.914
Age class 3 vs. 4 0.9024 (0.3448) 0.0089 1.972 0.679 5.729
Married −2.0241 (0.6973) 0.0037 0.132 0.034 0.518
PL not important −1.9307 (0.8577) 0.0244 0.145 0.027 0.779
Table 3 Parameter and odds ratio (OR) estimates for the binary logit model describing the effects of variables (Table 1) inﬂuencing the likelihood
of being an active monitor among members of PLCN. Model AIC= 93.7, SC= 111.2, -2 logL= 81.7, and n= 62
Parameter Estimate (SE) p-value OR estimate 95% Wald conﬁdence limits
Intercept −0.5280 (1.2315) 0.6681 – – –
NTFP collector 3.2051 (1.3846) 0.0206 24.657 1.634 372.006
Resin tapper 1.7603 (0.6515) 0.0069 5.814 1.622 20.845
Businessman/Woman −2.2063 (0.7174) 0.0021 0.110 0.027 0.449
Farmer −2.7948 (0.9787) 0.0043 0.061 0.009 0.416
Married −1.9198 (0.7247) 0.0081 0.147 0.035 0.607
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Motivation to Engage in Forest Monitoring
Activities
Respondents who had participated in commune-level
patrols in the past or present (n= 35) were requested to
rank ﬁve motivations for patrolling. The categories “protect
Prey Lang” and “stop illegal activities” resulted in similar
mean scores (μ= 4.3 and 3.8). According to many
respondents, the protection of Prey Lang was synonymous
with stopping illegal activities including incursions per-
formed in relation to ELCs. For this reason, the two cate-
gories were interpreted as one in the analysis. “Receiving
economic revenue” and “collecting NTFPs” were also
grouped together (μ= 1.9 and 2.3) and interpreted as
motivations related to livelihood outcomes of monitoring.
A comparison of the resulting two overall motivation
categories demonstrated that the motivations to protect Prey
Lang had a signiﬁcantly (p < 0.001) stronger association
with participation in monitoring than other motivations
related to livelihood outcomes of monitoring. In support of
this, most respondents mentioned never obtaining any rev-
enue from monitoring. The category “report illegal activ-
ities” did not seem to be a clear motivation for patrolling, as
it was consistently ranked third (μ= 2.7). A few monitors
added “being happy living in Prey Lang”, “loving nature”,
and “the protection of own land” as their second-most
important motivation, but none of these were common.
When asked if receiving a salary for monitoring would
change their ranking, all respondents except two answered
“No”. Many of them gave statements such as “without Prey
Lang there is no life”.
The respondents who were not members of PLCN (n=
75), 22% (n= 16) had never heard about the monitoring
network, even though they lived in villages where PLCN
operates. People who knew of PLCN and were not members
of it stated that the reason why they were not members was
that they had never been invited, were busy with other
activities, and/or had not received enough information about
PLCN. Non-PLCN members did not patrol the forests on
their own or with other groups.
Perceived Value of the Forest
In 78% of the interviews (n= 107 out of 137), Prey Lang
was mentioned as important for wood to build traditional
houses, resin trees for extraction of liquid (mainly) and solid
resin, and other natural resources. Twenty-four percent (n
= 33) mentioned ecological functions of the forest, such as,
regulating the rains, acting as a windbreak, preventing
ﬂoods, storing carbon, and regulating the climate, 20% (n
= 27) mentioned the wellbeing of future generations, and
17% (n= 23) explained that Prey Lang helps rice farming
and forest gardening. As the question was open-ended, the
respondents could mention more than one reason. Almost
10% (n= 13) of the respondents did not mention a speciﬁc
reason why Prey Lang was important, either because the
forest was not important for them or because they had never
reﬂected on it.
Illegal Activities Reported by the Local Monitors
The active members interviewed (n= 30) claimed that the
most common encounters in past patrols were illegal log-
gers: 63% (n= 19) of the respondents mentioned ﬁnding
outsiders clearing the forest to establish farms and 60% (n
= 18) had encountered people clearing forest for a com-
pany. In addition, 43% (n= 13) of the respondents had
found logs left on the ground or logs that were being
transported. Most of the respondents did not consider ﬁsh-
ing (87%, n= 26) and hunting (90%, n= 27) as illegal.
Licensed mining and other extractive activities were not
considered illegal (Fig. 2).
The active members claimed that they were successful in
stopping the illegal activities they encountered, either
always (55%) or occasionally (26%). Monitors felt most
successful in stopping illegal loggers working for a com-
pany (67% of the times encountered) and clearing land for
farms (47% of the times). PLCN made written and verbal
agreements with the perpetrators to stop logging in the
future. Illegal timber left on site was most often burned
(62% of cases), and illegal timber being transported was
most often conﬁscated (54% of the times).
Most of the active monitors (73%, n= 22) had been
threatened verbally by local authorities/police (60% of the
times). Threats were often of death, either targeting the
monitor personally or his or her family members. At other
times, monitors were threatened with imprisonment or had
Fig. 2 Percentage of respondents reporting different illegal activities
and the frequencies of these activities. The frequency categories were:
in every patrol (dark), often (intermediate), few times (light), and never
(white)
Environmental Management (2018) 61:1019–1030 1025
guns pointed at them. In fewer instances, district or village
headmen (13%), forestry administration (FA) ofﬁcials
(13%), or other local villagers and loggers (13%) had per-
suaded respondents not to patrol. According to the moni-
tors, the local authorities and other people in power, such as
village headmen, have vested interests in illegal logging
activities or are bribed to allow logging to take place. Seven
monitors had experienced conﬂicts with other villagers
when they burned illegal timber or conﬁscated chain-saws.
In addition, 43% (n= 13) of the active monitors had at
some point been pressured by local authorities (police,
village headmen, FA ofﬁcials), and loggers not to report an
illegal activity. Many respondents mentioned that they were
frequently told by the local authorities that they did not have
the right to patrol or conﬁscate materials.
Discussion
Socio-demographic and Economic Background of
Monitors
The present case study shows that not all local people are
willing to invest time and effort in actively trying to pre-
serve the forest. We found that, although most of the indi-
viduals interviewed cared for the existence of the forest and
the natural resources they can extract from it, active forest
monitoring is the work of a relatively few dedicated
individuals.
Members of PLCN, especially members taking part in
forest patrols, were characterized as being forest-users.
Irrespective of time of residence in the area, ethnicity and
gender, a connection between livelihoods and forest
resources, i.e., forest dependence, is a strong factor moti-
vating forest-monitoring activities. For example, business-
men or businesswomen and farmers were less likely to
participate in active monitoring.
Contrary to our results, a study from Nepal showed that
gender inﬂuences monitoring, as men and women are dif-
ferently involved in forest-related activities (Staddon et al.
2014). A study from Senegal argued that young people,
women, and hierarchically “lower-ranking” ethnic groups
participated less in politics (Crossouard and Dunne 2015).
In partial agreement with this, young people were less
commonly members of PLCN; however, ethnicity and
gender did not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence participation. Thus,
these factors appear to be context-speciﬁc. Nevertheless,
both the case of PLCN and the one presented by Crossouard
and Dunne (2015) represent examples of how different
segments of the society participate differently in processes
that affect them all, be it deforestation, as in our case, or
voting for presidential elections, as in their case. Although
gender was not signiﬁcantly associated with the likelihood
of engaging in monitoring, we noticed that the representa-
tion of women among the monitors was lower than for men
(27% of members and 14% of active members were
females). Women who engaged in monitoring were usually
free of family burdens, either because they were young and
not yet married, or because they had no small children. In
addition, female participation was highest in a village where
the provincial leader of PLCN was a woman and the core
member of the village surveyed was also a woman. Hence,
the study suggests that female leaders in the network can
inﬂuence the participation of other women in forest mon-
itoring positively, as also shown in other initiatives of
female grassroots movements for urban governance in the
Philippines, Nepal, and Uganda (Wyant and Spasić 2015).
Beyond socio-demographic and economic factors, in our
view, the context in which monitoring occurs must be taken
into account to understand the engagement in autonomous
monitoring. In Cambodia, as well as elsewhere, people are
likely to become ‘activists’ when they are directly affected
by a conﬂict, as bottom-up monitoring groups are usually
formed around a community-concern or a community need
(Lawrence et al. 2005; Thornton 2013). In Cambodia, the
community-concern or need is often the extraction of nat-
ural resources that are essential for the bio-cultural survival
of forest-dependent people. This is because Cambodia is a
highly biodiverse country with a very weak institutional
conservation strategy (Clements et al. 2010) and uncon-
trolled illegal timber extraction, in which the government,
the FA, and powerful tycoons are complicit (Global Witness
2002; Milne 2015). This makes local communities vulner-
able and provokes them to act for themselves.
Motivation to Engage in Forest Monitoring
Despite continuous threats and intimidation, some local
people are motivated to counteract illicit activities. When
international conservation NGOs or governments are seen
as remote institutions, local participants get motivated to
take part in environmental conservation, as they see them-
selves as the only ones capable or willing to identify and
resolve their concerns about the surrounding environment
(Goodwin 1998; Savan et al. 2003). This has promoted the
emergence of community-led monitoring in Prey Lang.
These motivations to engage in natural resource monitor-
ing highlights a fundamental difference between externally
driven monitoring [categories 1–4, according to Danielsen
et al. (2008)] and completely autonomous monitoring [cate-
gory 5]. In externally driven monitoring schemes, motivation
is often linked to incentives offered to the communities or to
the individuals involved. These incentives may be the ability
for local participants to use the collected data for decision-
making and management (Constantino et al. 2012; Boissière
et al. 2013), recognition of tenure rights (Veer et al. 2006;
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Ruiz-Mallén et al. 2015), recognition of legal access (Van
Rijsoort and Jinfeng 2005; Funder et al. 2013), and pecuniary
beneﬁts (Rode et al. 2015; Ruiz-Mallén et al. 2015). By
contrast, autonomous monitoring can occur even if these
beneﬁts are not offered. In our case study, the autonomous
PLCN was intrinsically motivated by protecting not only their
natural resources, but the whole landscape, as it is an inherent
part of their life and culture.
Similar to our case study, García-Amado et al. (2013)
explained that when there were no payments for biodi-
versity and ecosystem conservation, in their case study in
Mexico, intrinsic reasons for preserving nature (e.g.,
“because we should respect wild animals”) clearly domi-
nated over monetary or utilitarian motivations (e.g.,
“because it provides funds or allows us to have clean
water”). However, their study also revealed that, as the
number of years increased where payments were received,
the weight of utilitarian and, especially, monetary motiva-
tions increased at the expense of intrinsic reasons. Partici-
pation in a community-led natural resource monitoring in
Tanzania was sustained over time, because the local parti-
cipants were driven by long-term and indirect beneﬁts of
monitoring, such as territorial and resource control, rather
than by immediate economic incentives (Funder et al.
2013). Short-term economic incentives may not lead to
sustained participation (Poulsen and Luanglath 2005;
Staddon et al. 2015) and, therefore, externally incentivized
monitoring schemes are more likely to be successful, where
substantial intrinsic motivations for participation also exist.
Supporting the ﬁnding of Singh et al. (2014), who
assessed the motivations of hunters to monitor moose
populations over 26 years in Sweden, monitoring activities
that are based on what the participants consider important
makes engagement in monitoring rewarding in itself and
therefore inherently sustainable. The only precondition for
this is that, the communities are involved in deﬁning
monitoring objectives, which can happen in monitoring
categories 3–5 of Danielsen et al. (2008).
The reluctance to report illegal activities might be related
to mistrust in higher authorities, who are often involved in
the illegal logging and do not recognize the work and rights
of the monitoring network. Similarly, a case study from
rural Australia showed that when land managers did not
trust the authorities, they were less likely to report non-
compliance with weed control (Graham 2014). The pre-
ference of PLCN to participating in patrols, rather than
submitting reports to the authorities may also be linked to
the feeling of success of the patrols and the lack of results
from previous reporting to the authorities.
In addition to the motivation-categories included in our
study, there might be other behavioral reasons to engage in
patrols and, for example, other studies showed that a
reputation of being trustworthy and more altruistic than
others often motivates people to contribute for the public
good (Ostrom 1998; Milinski et al. 2002; Barclay 2004).
Yamagishi and Sato (1986) observed that different levels of
cooperation in relation to use of public goods in Japan were
affected by two types of motivation: greed (or desire to free
ride) and fear (of being seen as a “sucker”). Greed was
activated when the good was disjunctively produced and
fear when it was conjunctively produced. This indicates that
if forests or natural resources are seen as conjunctive goods,
or commons, individuals would tend to cooperate (Ostrom
1990). However, our case showed that there are other ele-
ments, such as forest dependency and wanting to protect the
territory from outsiders, which provide an additional moti-
vation to actively engage in community-led forest
monitoring.
Perceived Results of Monitoring
It is remarkable that, even though the active patrollers are
relatively few and hold no sanctioning power or rule
enforcement power, they perceive themselves to be suc-
cessful in stopping illegal activities. This supports the the-
oretical assumption that customary access does not depend
on coercive enforcement mechanisms (Ribot and Peluso
2009). In the case of weak or no institutional forest law
enforcement, common in most Asian countries (Geist and
Lambin 2002), local people tend to follow endogenous
rules, rather than externally imposed rules (Clements et al.
2010).
Conﬂicts in relation to the timber industry are a daily
concern in Cambodia, and it takes great courage by the
active monitors to stand up in front of illegal loggers and
corrupted authorities. Most monitors in Prey Lang relate
similar accounts, as in other parts of Cambodia, where local
people opposing illegal logging have experienced violent
threats by government ofﬁcials, armed forces, police,
powerful businessmen, and employees (Milne 2015). Death
threats and intimidation via phone calls are numerous. For
example, interviewees frequently mentioned that “the
authorities often remind us what happened to [the murdered
environmental activist] Chut Wutty when they ﬁnd us
patrolling the forest”.
Conclusion
While most studies have looked at beneﬁts such as land
titling and ownership as prerequisites for community-based
monitoring to occur (Agrawal 2001; Danielsen et al. 2005),
this study shows that autonomous community monitoring
can occur in a context where secure land tenure does not
exist, but with the expressed aim to protect the forest against
illegal activities.
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We show that despite the lack of power to enforce rules
and land-ownership rights, and enduring violent threats and
conﬂicts, “local people” may commit to protect their envir-
onment over long periods of time. The autonomous envir-
onmental monitoring organization PLCN was characterized
by volunteers that share a common concern about their
environment. Participation in monitoring was associated
with NTFP collection, age, marital status and perceived
values in relation to the forest. Forest dependency and being
married were found to increase the likelihood of actively
engaging in locally-led monitoring of natural resources.
The autonomous forest monitoring network was led by a
relatively small number of individuals and their main
motivation to engage in monitoring was the intrinsic wish to
protect their territory. Motivations are an important aspect
to consider when developing participatory projects as they
will determine the sustainability of the efforts over time
(Singh et al. 2014). When involving local communities in
externally-driven schemes, practitioners should consider
how external incentives interact with the strength of
‘intrinsic’ motivation to participate over time.
Results show that local communities are heterogeneous
in terms of interests toward environmental protection.
Agrawal and Gibson (2001) argued that practitioners
involving local communities in community-based resource
monitoring and management should accommodate both
internal—livelihoods, decision-making processes, age,
gender, ethnicity—and external characteristics—interac-
tions between the market, the state, and the community—of
particular communities in their project designs. Additionally
based on our results we recommend practitioners and
community members that would like to work with envir-
onmental monitoring for nature protection to consider
whether they would prefer to support the activity of indi-
viduals with substantial intrinsic motivation to participate or
to recruit and motivate a broader subset of the community.
Local monitors considered illegal logging as the main
threat to the forest and despite the adversities they con-
sidered themselves mostly successful in stopping illegal
activities. Nevertheless, if monitors had sanctioning power,
illegal logging in Prey Lang and other parts of Cambodia
could decrease. Community members who ﬁnd themselves
in weak institutional situations, such as the PLCN, and that
seek to escalate the impact of grassroots movements and
achieve successful protection of the territories and related
resources need positive institutional interactions (Gezon
1997; Persha et al. 2011; Graham 2014). These may be
achieved by working together with other organizations,
such as NGOs and Universities, which can help connecting
local communities and policy-makers or governments and
aligning the values and interests of each of the actors.
We recommend future monitoring programs and nature
conservation initiatives, either externally-driven or
community-led, to support and build on locally existing
autonomous monitoring and protection activities. When
initiatives are externally-driven we recommend bringing in
locally perceived relevant incentives to ensure long-term
participation, while also informing and involving local
communities in global agendas to protect the environment.
This would help operationalizing the principles of the
Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity
and Ecosystem Services, IPBES (and inherently the Con-
vention on Biological Diversity) to complement and build
upon existing initiatives relating to indigenous and local
knowledge systems through participatory processes (IPBES
2016). We encourage more studies to investigate and
document autonomous monitoring schemes in order to
understand what motivates and sustain local peoples’
engagement in environmental protection.
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